Municipality without Power to Levy Excise Tax on Water and Sewer Service by unknown
MUNICIPALITY WITHOUT POWER TO LEVY EXCISE TAX
ON WATER AND SEWER SERVICE
City of Franklin v. Harrison
171 Ohio St. 329, 170 N.E.2d 739 (1960)
The city of Franklin enacted an ordinance providing for a tax on the
water and sewer service which it furnished. The stated purpose of the
ordinance was to provide additional revenue for the general fund of the city.
Appellee refused to pay the tax and, pursuant to an affidavit filed in the
Municipal Court of Franklin, a warrant was issued for his arrest. The
appellee's demurrer to the affidavit was sustained on the ground that the
ordinance in question contravened state laws.' This decision was affirmed
by a split court of appeals, 2 and, with two dissenters, by the Supreme Court
of Ohio.
Section 6 of article XIII,3 and section 13 of article XVIII 4 of the
Ohio constitution, reserve in the General Assembly the right to establish
limitations on the power of municipalities to levy taxes.5 Section 729.526
and section 743.05 7 of the Ohio Revised Code expressly provide for the use
of surplus sewer and water rentals. The ordinance in question did not
create an additional water rental, but instead levied an excise tax computed
on the amount charged for water and sewer service used by the particular
consumer. Thus the city urged that the statutes were inapplicable.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bell, adopted the city's argument,
stating that it is a non sequitur to say that a municipal excise tax on these
services is precluded solely because surplus water revenues cannot be applied
to general governmental expenses. Thus, "an excise tax on water and sewer
bills is purely and simply an excise tax upon the consumers of a commodity
in a field that has not been pre-empted by the state." It is apparent that
the dissenters overlooked (or perhaps would have overruled sub silentio)
a case decided by the Ohio Supreme Court in 19468 wherein it was held,
1 City of Franklin v. Harrison, 153 N.E.2d 467 (Franklin Munic. Ct. 1957).
2 City of Franklin v. Harrison, 160 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
3 Ohio Const. art. XIII, § 6, provides that "The General Assembly shall provide
for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages, by general laws, and restrict
their power of taxation ... so to prevent the abuse of such power."
4 Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 13, provides that "Laws may be passed to limit
the power of municipalities to levy taxes. .. "
5 See Glander, "Analysis and Critique of State Pre-emption of Municipal Excise
and Income Taxes Under Ohio Home Rule," 21 Ohio St. LJ. 343 (1960).
6 Ohio Rev. Code § 729.52 provides that "Any surplus in such fund (sewer rental
fund) may be used for the enlargement or replacement of the system ... but shall not
be used ... for any other purpose."
7 Ohio Rev. Code § 743.05 provides that "After payment of the expenses of
conducting and managing the waterworks, any surplus . . . may be applied to the
repairs, enlargement, or extension of the works."
8 Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
on similar facts, that a municipal excise tax on utility service was impliedly
pre-empted by virtue of General Code sections 5546-29 and 5483.10
The majority, citing City of Cincinnati v. Roettinger," based their
opinion on the belief that the constitutional validity of the statutes in
question is predicated on their expression of a legislative intention that
municipalities shall not levy a tax on the use of water and sewerage service,
in order to provide funds for general municipal purposes. Section 4 of
article XVIII of the Ohio constitution established the right of municipalities
to "acquire, construct, own, lease and operate . . . any public utility the
products or service of which is or is to be supplied to the municipality or
its inhabitants." The provisions in this section have been held to be self-
executing and the powers granted to be free of restrictions or limitations by
the General Assembly.12 This is to say that the legislature may not pass
any law which interferes with or in any way burdens the municipality in
acquiring, constructing, owning, leasing, and operating a public utility.13 At
this juncture, it would appear that the statutes in question are hardly rec-
oncilable with the constitutional provision. Yet, reconciliation was ac-
complished in the instant case (as it was in Roettinger) by holding that
surplus water rentals were, in effect, excise taxes, thus validating the code
sections.
This interpretation began with the opinion of Judge Marshall in the
Roettinger case. That opinion is quite unique in that it asserts that nothing
can interfere with the right of municipalities to own and operate public
utilities while at the same time upholding the constitutionality of Revised
Code section 743.05.14 The reasoning of this opinion is that a water rental
used for general purposes amounts to a tax on the water users of the com-
munity. Thus, the statute does not interfere with the right of municipalities
to operate utilities but only limits their power to tax. Such limitation is
clearly within the constitutional power of the General Assembly. Cases
decided since Roettinger which involved a similar question, including the
instant case, have unanimously followed this doctrine.15
If one accepts the judicial definition of surplus water rentals as taxes
then the result in the instant case is quite easily reached; there is a tax
limitation statute and a tax of the type proscribed therein, the application
9 Now Ohio Rev. Code § 5739.02 provides that "for the purposes of provid-
ing revenue with which to meet the needs of the state . . . an excise tax is hereby
levied on each retail sale made in the state. ... ."
10 Now Ohio Rev. Code § 5727.39 provides that "the auditor of state shall
charge from each electric, gas, waterworks . . . company, a sum in the nature of an
excise tax for the privilege of carrying on its ... business."
11 City of Cincinnati v. Roettinger, 105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922).
12 Pfau v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 101, 50 N.E.2d 172 (1943).
13 City of Cincinnati v. Roettinger, supra note 10; State ex rel. McCann v. City
of Defiance, 167 Ohio St. 313, 148 N.E.2d 221 (1958).
14 Ohio Gen. Code § 3959.
15 City of Lakewood v. Rees, 132 Ohio St. 399, 8 N.E.2d 250 (1937); Hartwig
Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 128 Ohio St. 583, 192 N.E. 880 (1934).
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of the former invalidates the latter. However, the question brought to bear
is the desirability and validity of the definition.
There are clear distinctions between the ordinary utility revenue and
a tax.16 The operation of the municipally owned utility is controlled by an
administrative agency appointed by the municipal authority. This agency is
vested with the authority to fix the rates to be charged for the particular
utility service. On the other hand the levy of taxes is a legislative function
"and taxes cannot be imposed by an administrative officer."' 7 The distinc-
tion becomes more apparent if ordinary rates are considered as the measure
of a value received and taxes as pecuniary contributions made for the
support of government.
When one considers an excess utility revenue which is to be used for
general governmental purposes, however, there is no longer a distinction.
To the extent that it is excess, that revenue is no longer a rate for it is
not a measure of a value received. When it is then applied to the general
fund it clearly becomes a contribution for the support of government. The
economic impact is undoubtedly the same.
Thus, it may be said that the statutes involved in the instant case are
constitutionally valid limitations on the power of a municipality to levy a
tax on water and sewerage service. The ordinance in question provides for
just such a tax and therefore contravenes the state law.
16 See Farrell, "Municipal Public Utility Power," 21 Ohio St. LJ. 390 (1960).
'7 Supra note 16, at page 407.
